State of Utah v. Natasha Hawley : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
State of Utah v. Natasha Hawley : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Edward K. Brass; Attorney for Appellant.
Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General; William L.
Benge; Grand County Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Hawley, No. 20000738 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2878
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20000738 
NATASHA HAWLEY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ONE COUNT OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
6-44 (1998), AND ONE COUNT OF LEAVING THE 
SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-30 
(1998) IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LYLE 
R. ANDERSON, PRESIDING 
EDWARD K. BRASS (432) 
175 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
WILLIAM L. BENGE 
Grand County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Attorney for Appellant 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
NATASHA HAWLEY, 
Defendant/Appellant 
Case No. 20000738-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR ONE COUNT OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE, A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-
6-44 (1998), AND ONE COUNT OF LEAVING THE 
SCENE OF AN ACCIDENT, A CLASS B MISDEMEANOR, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-6-30 
(1998) IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, THE HONORABLE LYLE 
R. ANDERSON, PRESIDING 
EDWARD K. BRASS (432) 
175 East 400 South, #400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK (4414) 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
WILLIAM L. BENGE 
Grand County Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Attorney for Appellant 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 
I. BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISQUALIFY THE 
ASSIGNED JUDGE WAS UNTIMELY FILED, THE REVIEWING 
JUDGE PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER IT; EVEN IF 
THE CLAIM IS RAISED AS PLAIN ERROR, EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES, OR INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE, IT 
ULTIMATELY FAILS FOR LACK OF PREJUDICIAL 
EFFECT 9 
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED DEFENDANT'S 
REFUSAL TO TAKE A CHEMICAL BREATH TEST; EVEN 
HAD THE COURT ERRED, THE ERROR WOULD LIKELY HAVE 
MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO THE OUTCOME OF DEFENDANT'S 
TRIAL 14 
III. THE EVIDENCE OF TWO OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ALCOHOL-
RELATED CONVICTIONS SUFFICED TO TRIGGER SECTION 
41-6-44(6) (a) AND INCREASE THE CHARGE OF DRIVING 
UNDER THE INFLUENCE FROM A MISDEMEANOR TO A THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY 17 
CONCLUSION 20 
ADDENDUM A - Defendant's previous convictions 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
STATE CASES 
Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685 (Utah 1989) 16 
Rushton v. Salt Lake County, 977 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1999) 2 
Salt Lake Citv v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 (Utah 1994) 15 
State v. Amicone, 689 P.2d 1341 (Utah 1984) 15 
State y. Blubaugh, 904 P.2d 688 (Utah App. 1995) 17 
State v. Butterfield, 784 P.2d 153 (Utah 1989) 13 
State v. Cravens, 1999 UT App 156 19 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993) 13 
State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540 (Utah 1994) 2 
State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 415 (Utah App. 1997) 18 
State v. Lopez, 1999 UT 12 
State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313 (Utah 1998) 20 
State v. Moss. 921 P.2d 1021 (Utah App. 1996) 18 
State v. Neelev. 748 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1988) 10, 11, 12 
State v. Rivas, 2000 UT App 9 12 
State v. Ross. 951 P.2d 236 (Utah App. 1997) 12 
State v. Steraer. 808 P.2d 122 (Utah App. 1991) 15 
State v. Triptow, 770 P.2d 146 (Utah 1989) 19 
State v. Tuckett, 2000 UT App 295, 13 P.3d 1060 13 
State v. Williams, 773 P.2d 1368 (Utah 1989) 19 
Warren v. Provo City Corp.. 838 P.2d 1125 (Utah 1992) 13 
ii 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 (1999) 2, 17 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (Supp. 2000) 2, 14, 15 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4 18 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29 1, 3, 9, 10, 11 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20000738-CA 
NATASHA HAWLEY, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for one count of driving 
under the influence of alcohol, a third degree felony, and one 
count of leaving the scene of an accident, a class B misdemeanor. 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court correctly interpret rule 29 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, when it refused to consider the 
merits of defendant's untimely motion to disqualify the judge? 
2. Where the governing statute plainly directs that a 
defendant's urefus[al] to submit to a chemical test . . . is 
admissible in any . . . criminal action," did the trial court err 
in admitting defendant's refusal to submit to a breath test? 
The trial court's interpretation of a statute or rule 
presents a question of law, reviewed for correctness. Rushton v. 
Salt Lake County. 977 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Utah 1999). 
3. Where the State produced proof that defendant had twice 
been convicted of alcohol-related offenses in Utah, did the 
evidence suffice to sustain her driving under the influence 
conviction as a third degree felony, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
41-6-44? 
An appellate court "will reverse a criminal conviction for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence is so inconclusive 
or so inherently improbable that 'reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt' that the defendant committed the 
crime." State v. Goddard, 871 P.2d 540, 543 (Utah 1994)(citation 
omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(8), governing implied consent to 
chemical tests for alcohol or drugs, provides: 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to 
submit to a chemical test or tests or any 
additional test under this section, evidence 
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or 
criminal action or proceeding arising out of 
acts alleged to have been committed while the 
person was operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10(8)(Supp. 2000). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a minor vehicle collision, defendant was charged 
with driving under the influence, a third degree felony, and 
leaving the scene of an accident, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). 
Two-and-a-half months later, defendant, a practicing attorney, 
filed a motion to disqualify the trial judge, before whom she 
regularly appeared (R. 20). After certification to another judge 
for determination pursuant to rule 29, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, defendant's motion was denied as untimely filed (R. 
26, 31-32). 
After a preliminary hearing, defendant was bound over for 
trial (R. 41). She then filed several motions to suppress, all 
of which were denied (R. 44-45, 53-54, 55) . Following a trial by 
jury, defendant was convicted as charged (R. 103). The court 
sentenced her to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison on 
the alcohol charge and six months in the Grand County Jail for 
leaving the scene of an accident. The court stayed the prison 
sentence, ordering that defendant be released directly to an 
inpatient alcohol treatment program after serving her jail time 
and that she serve 3 6 months on probation with Adult Probation 
and Parole. Additionally, the court imposed $1850 in fines and 
suspended defendant's license to practice law for twelve months 
(R. 117-20). This timely appeal followed (R. 126). 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On a January night in 2 000, defendant, driving to her 
boyfriend's house, stopped at a Maverick station to purchase two 
six-packs of Zima1 (R. 133: 62, 89-90). Following her purchase, 
she backed out of her parking space and ran into a truck parked 
at the gas pumps (Id. at 50, 90). Defendant exited her vehicle 
to talk to the driver of the truck. She told the driver she had 
insurance and would take care of any damage (Id. at 52, 91).2 
At this juncture, the testimony of defendant and the driver 
of the truck differ. The driver, Kristina Jim, testified that 
she asked defendant for her insurance information. Jim handed 
defendant a piece of paper on which to write, but defendant's 
handwriting was illegible (Id. at 53). Consequently, Jim asked 
defendant if she had something in printed form. Defendant 
responded that she had left her driver's license and insurance 
card at home (Id. at 53, 57). Jim then wrote down defendant's 
license plate number and told defendant she was going inside to 
report the accident to the police (Id. at 53-54) . After entering 
the store, Jim turned around and looked back towards the parking 
area. Defendant's vehicle was gone (Id. at 55). 
Jim described defendant as "having a hard time standing," 
1
 Zima, according to its manufacturer, is a "lightly 
carbonated alcohol beverage" containing 4.8% alcohol by volume. 
See www.coors.com/brews/zima.asp. 
2
 Damage to the truck amounted to $901.95 (R. 133: 56). 
4 
"holding onto the vehicle," and "wreathing [sic] the smell of 
alcohol" (Id. at 54-55) . The Maverick clerk also testified that! 
when defendant had made her purchase, he had smelled alcohol on 
her breath (Id. at 63). 
According to defendant, when Jim requested her insurance 
documentation, defendant went to her vehicle to look for it (Id. 
at 91). When she finished looking, however, Jim was gone (Id. 
92). According to defendant, she looked unsuccessfully for Jim, 
both inside and outside the Maverick store. And although 
defendant noticed a pay phone in the Maverick parking lot, she 
instead drove to her boyfriend's home, about a mile away, to call 
the Sheriff's Office and report the accident (Id.). 
Defendant flatly denied that she was under the influence o$ 
alcohol at the time of the accident (Id.). Rather, she testified 
that she drove to her boyfriend's house, where she parked her 
car. Then, "upset" and "shaky" about the accident, she "pulled 
out a bottle of vodka and took several drinks out of it . . . t0 
calm down" (Id. at 92-93). She then went inside and called the 
sheriff (Id^ at 93). 
The Grand County Sheriff's Office received two calls about 
the accident, the first one from the Maverick store and the 
second, somewhat later, from defendant (Id. at 73). A Sheriff's 
deputy responded to the Maverick store, where he met with Jim 
(Id. at 73-74). When the second call came in to the dispatcher, 
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the deputy asked that defendant be directed back to the scene. 
Defendant, however, responded to the dispatcher that she had 
already parked her car and was out of the vehicle (Id. at 74). 
Accordingly, the deputy, followed by Jim, drove to defendant's 
boyfriend's house to meet defendant (Id.). 
Observed by the deputy, defendant came out of her 
boyfriend's house with her insurance card (Id. at 75). The 
deputy testified that "she was a little unsteady on her feet" 
and, when she came through the front gate, "seemed to have a 
difficulty in closing [it]." (Id.). He further testified that he 
"could smell a very strong odor of alcohol comin' from her" 
(Id.). The deputy asked her if she'd had anything to drink. She 
said she'd "'had a couple'" (Id.). He then asked "if she'd had 
anything to drink since the accident" (Id.)(emphasis added). She 
told him that she had not (Id. at 75, 99). 
Again, defendant provided a different version of what 
happened. According to her, she told the dispatcher that she did 
not want to return to the Maverick store because she knew she had 
been drinking and, therefore, did not want to drive (Id. at 94). 
And, she said, when the deputy later asked her if she had had 
anything to drink, she responded, "'Yes, I've had a couple or two 
or three'" (Id. at 95). But, she testified, "then he asked me if 
I'd had anything to drink since reporting the accident and I said 
no" (Id.)(emphasis added). 
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Based on his observations, the deputy engaged defendant in 
three field sobriety tests, all of which she was unable to 
successfully complete (Id. at 77-79). Concluding that defendant 
was too drunk to operate a motor vehicle, the deputy arrested her 
(Id. at 80-81). After being transported to the Sheriff's Office, 
defendant refused to take a chemical breath test because, she 
testified, she knew she had been drinking (Id. at 80). 
Nonetheless, she maintained that she had not been drinking before 
the accident, and that her alcohol consumption had occurred only 
after the accident, in the interim between parking her car at her 
boyfriend's house and telephoning the Sheriff's office to report 
the accident (Id. at 96) . 
Presented with this evidence, the jury deliberated for 
forty-five minutes and convicted defendant as charged (Id. at 
106) . 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted 
her motion to disqualify the judge because her service as an 
officer of the court created an appearance of bias. This 
argument fails on two grounds. First, the reviewing court acted 
properly in denying the motion without considering its merits 
because the motion was filed almost two months late, and the 
governing statute plainly accords the court the discretion to 
dismiss untimely filed motions to disqualify. Second, even if 
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the argument were to be considered under the rubric of plain 
error or exceptional circumstances or ineffective assistance of 
counsel, as defendant urges, it would fail because defendant has 
not carried her burden of demonstrating that the substitution of 
another judge would likely have made a difference to the outcome 
of her trial. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in 
admitting testimony that she refused to take a chemical breath 
test. This argument fails because the plain statutory language 
is explicit that such a refusal is admissible. Further, even if 
the trial court had erred, the error would necessarily have been 
harmless because the evidence was cumulative of what even 
defendant conceded - that she had been drinking. The only 
question, which the breath test would not have answered, was 
whether defendant's alcohol consumption occurred before or after 
the accident. 
Finally, defendant argues that the evidence of two prior 
alcohol-related convictions was insufficient to support the 
enhancement of the present offense from a misdemeanor to a third 
degree felony. Where the State produced two written, clear, 
signed judgments, however, the judgments enjoy a presumption of 
regularity and validity. The burden then shifted to defendant to 
produce evidence of their fatal flaws. Where defendant failed to 
do so, her argument fails. 
8 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
BECAUSE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISQUALIFY THE ASSIGNED JUDGE WAS 
UNTIMELY FILED, THE REVIEWING JUDGE 
PROPERLY REFUSED TO CONSIDER IT; 
EVEN IF THE CLAIM IS RAISED AS 
PLAIN ERROR, EXCEPTIONAL 
CIRCUMSTANCES, OR INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE, IT ULTIMATELY FAILS FOR 
LACK OF PREJUDICIAL EFFECT 
Defendant argues that the assigned judge should have recused 
himself because defendant was an attorney who regularly practiced 
before him. Her service as an officer of the court, asserts 
defendant, "at a minimum constituted a circumstance from which 
[the trial court's] impartiality was reasonably subject to 
question [sic]." Br. of App. at 23. In essence, then, defendant 
seems to be arguing that the assigned judge's handling of her 
case created at least the appearance of bias. 
The reviewing judge properly declined to reach this issue. 
Defendant was charged on January 28, 2000 (R. 1-2). On April 11+, 
defendant filed a motion to disqualify the judge, accompanied by 
an affidavit of prejudice (R. 20-24) . On April 18, pursuant to 
rule, the assigned judge certified the motion to another judge 
for determination (R. 26). See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c). The 
reviewing judge did not reach the merits, but rather denied the 
motion because it was untimely (R. 31-32). The reviewing judge 
also found that because defendant had known all of the 
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circumstances giving rise to her motion from the outset of the 
case, the motion was filed for purposes of delay (Id.).3 
Consequently, the case was referred back to the original judge.4 
The reviewing court's ruling was correct as a matter of law. 
Rule 2 9 provides that: 
The motion shall be filed after commencement 
of the action, but not later than 20 days 
after the last of the following: 
(i) assignment of the action or hearing to 
the judge; 
(ii) appearance of the party or the 
party's attorney; or 
(iii) the date on which the moving party 
learns or with the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have learned of the grounds 
upon which the motion is based. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (1) (B) (emphasis added) . The rule also 
clearly grants the judge discretion to dismiss an untimely 
motion. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c) (3) (C) ("The reviewing judge 
3
 Defendant takes issue with this assertion of delay. See 
Br. of App. at 26. The clear untimeliness of the motion, 
however, is dispositive of her claim. That is, the rule requires 
reassignment of a case only if all three criteria of the rule are 
met. See Utah R. Crim. P. 29(c)(3)(A)(reviewing judge must assign 
the case to another judge only if "the reviewing judge finds that 
the motion and affidavit are timely filed, filed in good faith, 
and legally sufficient"(emphasis added)). Because the motion was 
plainly untimely and could be denied on that ground alone, 
whether it was filed in good faith or for purposes of delay need 
not even be considered at this juncture. 
4
 Even on the merits, defendant's claim fails. It is 
undisputed that both the assigned and reviewing judges fulfilled 
the requirements of rule 29. Consequently, absent a showing of 
actual bias or abuse of discretion, the assigned judge's failure 
to recuse himself cannot constitute reversible error. See State 
v. Neelev, 748 P.2d 1091, 1094-95 (Utah 1988). 
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mav denv a rnot ion ^o*- - j . ^ n - ^ t i ^^ i^ v ^anre"*"" ) 
Defendant does not dispute that r^.^  <new from the outset 
t:.- ..-*r tj*_e was assigned ._*. _ -3 fore whom she regularly 
practiced law. Mcr ices sne dispute tha* her -notion was filed 
W~ -r - - .6 
p l a i n language oi r u . e 29 r.ner:. tne reviewing judge acted wi 'hir . 
i - > ^ * - . • 
Defendant asserts nonetneiess that. - n*s tourt should 
consider the merits of her claim for the first time on appeal. 
Her first argument rests on the legally incorrect assertion that 
"rule [29] does not supersede Canon 3 [of the Code of Judicial 
O induct] , or obviate the importance of the judicial 
responsibility \: eradicate the appearance .->: -udicial bi^ :?" 
( : 
noted tnat *ailure * observe jCanor - 'nay -> inject' tte jdge to 
d * - - - *- * - • . - ..
 r s 
ot aefendar ::::;sc , tut . ct'-i. 1 :gr.ts ~ t . . -.re :a: :r- d 
b^ r ' ne Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] and relevant case law, 
not zhe Code of J udicial Conduct." State v. Neeley, 74 8 P.2d 
1"9 1 ^ 4 Ttah ] 98 8) (emphasi s i n original) 5 Because rule 29 
g _ .. . . • :ase, tl le 1 e v ie M ing judge pr operly declined to rparh 
the merits of defendant's claim:-!. 
Neeley refers ;:^ u to tl ie Utan 
out to statutory sections that have be 
substance i;: embodied the current r 
*adi fiucedi i i : e 
1 and whose 
3 'jt trimmai orrcedure. 
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Defendant also urges this Court to reach his claim on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel, plain error, or 
exceptional circumstances. See Br. of App. at 26-29. All three 
theories fail. First, the ineffectiveness claim fails because 
"[c]ounsel's failure to bring motions that would have been futile 
does not equal ineffective assistance." State v. Lopez, 1999 UT 
fl (citing Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994)); 
accord State v. Rivas, 2000 UT App 9 %1. Here, even had counsel 
timely filed a motion to disqualify the judge, that conduct would 
have been futile because the law does not require recusal under 
the factual circumstances of this case. See Neeley, 748 P.2d at 
1094-95 (failure to recuse not reversible error where defendant 
does not demonstrate actual bias or abuse of discretion). 
Second, the plain error claim fails because defendant has 
not shown that the law was clear at the time of trial. State v. 
Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) (stating "error is not 
plain where there was no settled appellate law to guide the trial 
court"). That is, defendant asserts that it should have been 
obvious to the assigned judge that he should not hear a case in 
which an attorney practicing before him was the defendant. 
However, where no established appellate law supports this 
proposition, the alleged error could not have been obvious to the 
court. 
Third, the exceptional circumstance doctrine, which applies 
12 
"primarily ~o rare procedural anomalies/' has no applicability 
he re . State v. Dunn, 850' P . 2 d 1201, 12 0 9 n. 3 (Ut ah 19 9 3 ) . 
Indeed. , - 1: le assigi led ji i :ig s ai i :i t:l: I = i e i ; ' :i e :i i: lg judge f : ] ] : s :i 
precisely the mandates of Rule 29 in ruling on defendant's 
n loti on. 
In any event., all of defendant's arguments ultimately turn 
c n |: • i e j i id:i • ::• 2 t:• : defendant and they all ultimately fail because 
defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of a 
better out~:,me to her trial nad rbe alleged errc^ h» assigned 
judge s ^ ^ ur^ to recuse himsej-i - not- occurred. ,^-e J:J:° ". 
Tuckett, 2C"0 *"r' A-r / -- c. J P . d . 6 c. air errv , 5t a\e 
. ^acceri.ta. * 
assistance) ; cf barren v. Provo City Co it ^3 F - J . .. •' 
statute it imitations def erica:.t speculates tr.a^  n as 
- s admission both or ner refusal to cdKc une 
breath test at •-".?= sheriff's office and of her previous alcoh^1-
related convictions. See Br. cf App ** -<= ^ v^ i^ .-.---^  
Points Two and Three, however. ; .i . . ./ 
correct. Thus, had anctr.-fj ' .dge presided ever defendan* -
n^d tne previous convictions would likely have been the same. 
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POINT TWO 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED 
DEFENDANT'S REFUSAL TO TAKE A 
CHEMICAL BREATH TEST; EVEN HAD THE 
COURT ERRED, THE ERROR WOULD LIKELY 
HAVE MADE NO DIFFERENCE TO THE 
OUTCOME OF DEFENDANT'S TRIAL 
Section 41-6-44.10(8), governing admissibility of chemical 
tests for alcohol or drugs, provides: 
(8) If a person under arrest refuses to 
submit to a chemical test or tests or any 
additional test under this section, evidence 
of any refusal is admissible in any civil or 
criminal action or proceeding arising out of 
acts alleged to have been committed while the 
person was operating or in actual physical 
control of a motor vehicle while under the 
influence of alcohol . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44.10 (Supp. 2000). 
Despite plain statutory language, defendant argues that the 
court erred in admitting testimony that she had refused to take a 
chemical breath test. See Br. of App. at 36. On appeal, 
defendant's argument turns on the phrase "under this section," 
which she assumes modifies not the preceding phrase "or any 
additional test," but rather implicates all the requirements 
provided for in the entire statute governing driving under the 
influence. For this sweeping interpretation, defendant cites 
several statutory construction cases that require courts to 
evaluate statutes "as a whole, and in the context of their 
operation" (Br. of App. at 35). 
Specifically, however, after defendant's brief quotes the 
14 
1 e n g t h y s t a t u t e :i i i :i t: s e i 11:11: e t: y , d e f e i 1 d a i 11: s t: a t e s o i 1J y 11: i a 1: t: i I e 
statute "sets forth very specific procedural requirements that: 
a l l s t a t e ac tc T: s :i i i :::][ i idii lg tl le p :: 1 :i c e til: I = :I:i : :i • = i s 1 :i iiense 
division, and the courts, must: follow as prerequisites to the 
l e g a l f i i id :i i lg a .i id :i i i: t|: : s i t::i ::: -i I : f the ::: Diiseqi ;iei:i ::ies : f a :i : efi :i ; sa l" 
(Id. at 35-36) . While defendant implies that these "procedural 
requirements" were unmet, thus precluding admissibility of the 
breath test refusal, she does not explicate 1 ler position or 
provide any .Legal authority for the resuit sh^ seeks For this 
reason alone, the court may ref-s-.. - ::. j-_..' her claim.' State 
v. Ami cone. o8 9 P. 2d . *4 . --4 /"a: _ — 4 . , -it ate v. Stergei: , 
In any event:, the statute . s /rystal clear on its face. 
F~*" . . . admi ssi b] = • :i i: l a JI: i} 
, :rimmai action ' .-.-*.. . ,ae A:. *. -44.10(8). No 
further andiysis is necessai t Lake Cit^ -
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 850 n.1,4 (Utah 1994)(explaining that 
6
 In the trial court, defendant contended that a refusal to 
take a breath test would be admissible only if the driver's 
license division, pursuant to an unspecified subsection of 
section 41-6-44.10'., had entered a finding of fact at an 
administrative license revocation hearing attesting to 
defendant's refusal to take the breath test (R. 44-45), Becai ise 
the driver's license division did not make such a finding, 
defendant asserted that her refusal was not admissible under 
section 41-6-44.10 (Id,) .. The trial court considered and 
rejected this argument, stating that "evidence of any refusal, i s 
'admissible, regardless of what the administrative determination 
was" (R. 1,33 i 38) . 
15 
statutory language is the first source of statutory 
interpretation); Brinkerhoff v. Forsvth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 
1989)(where statutory language is plain, appellate courts will 
look no further). 
And, in any event, defendant's refusal to take the breath 
test did nothing to alter the evidentiary picture one way or the 
other. The evidence was undisputed that defendant had been 
drinking. The clerk at the Maverick store testified that he 
smelled alcohol on defendant's breath at the time he sold her two 
six-packs of Zima (R. 63). The driver of the vehicle struck by 
defendant's car testified that defendant smelled strongly of 
alcohol and was having a difficult time maintaining her balance, 
leaning on the vehicle to stay upright (R. 54-55). And the 
responding law enforcement officer also testified that defendant 
smelled of alcohol, was a little unsteady on her feet, and failed 
all three field sobriety tests that she was asked to perform (R. 
75, 77-79). Indeed, defendant herself admitted that she had been 
drinking prior to the time that the officer asked her to take the 
breath test (R. 93) .7 Thus, it was undisputed that defendant had 
been drinking. The only question, which a breath test would not 
have answered, was whether her alcohol consumption occurred 
7
 Defendant also admitted that she had refused to take the 
test, offering two explanations for her actions -- that she knew 
she had been drinking and that, at the time, she was scared (R. 
96-97) . 
16 
before or after the accident. 
Because evidence •~r defendant's refusal " % M / - "he rrea^i 
test was merely cumul ai_v-.- .;<-.•;.•••. •: -_ . 
its absence ;:ould not reasonably have made any difference t;. ~ -
o , . . - . -.7 •....;. . -j f - r : 
turned on "-.-: - :rv 3 assessment :; r the relative credibility 3: 
def - J - •. ' ; '"'p ' trie 
Maverick store cier* See State v. B±.. i, ?.;*i .- .. J oco -T?-^  
95 (Utah App. 1395; { iu ±s within ine cv — — - f — ^  -ur-* to 
judge the credibility of the testimony ,.^ . issign A-eign'. t •: he 
evidence ) With or without the =*ddi-'"' ^  • ^ "", -i^ n-*^  ~)f 
defendant's refusal to take t:l le . . *. : 
defendant's trial would likely have beer; the same. 
POINT THREE 
THE EVIDENCE OP1 TWO OF DEFENDANT'S 
PRIOR ALCOHOL-RELATED CONVICTIONS 
SUFFICED TO TRIGGER SECTION 41-6-
44(6)(a) AND INCREASE THE CHARGE OF 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE FROM A 
MISDEMEANOR TO A THIRD DEGREE 
FELONY 
Utah Code Ann, § 41-6-44 providti rhat a statutory v nation 
"within six years of t" - ^ ore prior •: nvictions ...uder 
s ec t i on" r e 1: 1 ie 1: s 11: 1 e 
§ 41-6-44 (6) (a) (1999) Defendant contends that the -tar-r adduced 
insi 3 ffici e" '" ' » , - 1 « « J ie 
felony status : : *~:;e urrent offense, ^ee 3r JI Ape, at 4 1 - 4 2 . 
The State presented certified documentation of four prior 
alcohol-related actions against defendant (R. 134: 4-5). One 
documented a plea in abeyance for alcohol-related reckless 
driving. See Def. Ex. #3. The trial court correctly concluded, 
however, that the plea did not amount to a '"conviction" and could 
not, therefore, serve as a basis for classifying the current 
offense as a felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-2a-4(l)(providing 
that trial court does not enter a conviction when a plea in 
abeyance entered accepted); accord State v. Hunsaker, 933 P.2d 
415, 416 (Utah App. 1997) (appeal taken from order on a plea in 
abeyance does not constitute an appeal from a final order); State 
v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1025 n.7 (Utah App. 1996) (plea in 
abeyance not a final adjudication). 
While the trial court determined that the second document, a 
certified copy of a Colorado judgment for driving under the 
influence, was a valid conviction, it chose to rely on two Utah 
convictions as the basis for its ruling that defendant's present 
offense should be classified as a third degree felony (R. 134: 
13-14). The court stated: 
I'm taking the judgments at face value - as 
if the judges had done everything they should 
have done to make them valid. And if they're 
not valid, the defendant would have the right 
to go back and collaterally attack them . . . 
and ask that they be set aside or modified. 
I think that's the proper procedure. 
(Id. at 13). 
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The trial court's conclusion that the two Utah judgments 
sufficed to render defendant's present offense a felony was 
correct. Here, the State submitted as proof • ::>f the previous 
convictions -wo document: s ~ ne enritled Tudanent, Sentence 
( - .. - , (I)' i Ie t: See 
Eef. Exs -t » : nddendu :?c * h ve r e s i a n e d by j u d g e s . The 
1 ji idgment 
signec \v - -- " r a. :ourc is sufficient prco: of a prior 
convicLiuri. :il'=„. _~.OX§nj§ , 1999 u'i A.. - (citing State ;\ [ 
Anderson, lon P.;:d 11.4, 1^1" ,'Lctn A D D _-; 
P:rth o" n^dcnren*"s of "* ^rv^^r^r^ ^ -'•- ,^  -^^^^ attestmc to 
defendant ... — ^onv*j^ions -i~r ai.::; ..e^di^c reiK^ess :rv. -
in r m s cas^. carry ^ presumption ••£ - ..ar * % an: "alidity. 
Williams, 773 F-.^ d 1 • ~ ;B. ' * ;4 't: - -coording!/, -v e 
t ' 3 
"burden is •; :ne defendant to raise :ne iss.e and proauce some 
evi den ne " " --.rr~rt ins posiuion. J^AJT-Qw """ P. id at
 x49. 
Here, defendant ignores her burden to produce evidence and 
instead merely speculates *~u-a~ •• -^ prngp-'i--T ^a:".^i - -• 55-ate a 
f a c t u a 1 b a s i s £ o 1: 
convictions. Br of App. at 42.8 Such speculation does :.othmg 
8
 Defendant also argues that one conviction is ambi-j-,. 
because the second page includes a reference to defendant 
entering a guilty plea to "DUI to Reckless," omitting any 
1 £ 
to rebut the presumption of regularity attaching to the 
convictions. Consequently, defendant's argument must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
convictions for driving under the influence of alcohol and 
leaving the scene of an accident. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j_f_ day of April, 2001. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
reference to alcohol. See Br. of App. at 42. However, where the 
first page unambiguously refers to section 41-6-44(10) and 
specifically states, "DUI reduced to Reckless-Alc/Drug Related," 
there is no ambiguity. Defendant's claim is thus frivolous on 
its face. See State v. Marvin, 964 P.2d 313, 3-- (Utah 1998). 
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STATE OF UTAH 
County* Salt u*# JiSSXSS!s3^a^S6stP-^ Court. State of Utah 
<»rt^th*tth««i^^ SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT. DIVISION II 
w y d a n c r t Q ^ East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
W l i n t w m j m ^ i m ^ z A l T h i s / A 
- « n * m ^ w » ^ . . s w 2P38TENCE/JUDGMENT/0RDER 
Criminal/Traffic 
^ ^ I r l i H , Kj^f f tS^f l 
Defendant 
Case Number_9 7 ^ 0 / V f ^ 
Tape Number c # 
Date \ln\/ ^ 199*7 lime 
Judge/Gomm id i i.urtrvi LLL 
citric jnnaueji--
&***.-rr 
DOB; /. 
Interpreter _ 
CHARGES . 
Plaintiff Counsel. 
U -,I„L 
Defense Counsel 
Amended A £ , £ . 
Amended 
THE COURT SENTENCED THE DEFENDANT AS FOLLOWS: 
m Jail <3£ HflW-S Suspended. 
-2£ flftt/LS 
Defendant to Commence Serving Jail Sentence. 
(2) Fine Amt $ LiaflO Susp. $ Fee$ Rne Bal $ 
<?<3 TOTAL FINE(S) DUE $ 
Payment Schedule: Pay $ \£C?~ per month/1 st Pmt. Due / - < ? - * ? £ Last Pmt. Due 10 -&9fr* 
(3) Court Costs $ , 
(4) Community Service/WP V t i u^io A through OCXXPT - i3<J .9 -.-ft? - 9 j ^ 
(5) Restitution $ Pay to: G Court G Victim G Snow Proof to Court 
Attorney Fees $ 
(6) Probation l.fl i r y w i r t t & . r^ Good Behavior G AP&P D ACEC 0 Other 
(7) Terms of probation: 
,-dp No Further Violations 
G AA Meetings __ / wk /month 
G Follow Program 
G No Alcohol 
G Antibuoe 
G Employment 
G Counseling tnru 
G lrroSTTreatment 
G Health Testing _ 
G Crime Lao Procedure 
D 
>S Proof of RtJSM&i 
-. dz?r TO
 t St? (8) Plea in Abeyance/ Diversion 
(0) Review _ / / at _ 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, in« 
neeaing special accommodations (inducting aiodtiary commi 
aids and service) during this proceeding should call Thi 
Court at 236-7391, at feast three working days prior to the proceeding, 
APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 DAYS OF JUDGMENT STAMP USE! TTWI^JUDGE" 
+JJ* 
THIRD CIRCUIT COURT - WVC 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITY OF WEST VALLEY CITY JUDGMENT, SENTENCE 
VS (COMMITMENT) 
HAWLEY, NATASHA CASE NO: 955013 3 27 
680 E 5TH AVE DOB: 10/26/68 
SLC UT TAPE: COUNT: 
DATE: 02/28/96 
CITATION: , 
THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT BEING ADJUDGED GUILTY FOR THE 
OFFENSE(S) AS FOLLOWS: 
Charge: 41-6-44(10) DUI REDUCED TO RECKLESS-ALC/DRUG RELATED 
Plea: Find: Guilty Plea 
Fine: 600.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 60 DA Susp: 60 DA ACS: 
Charge: 41-12A-302 OPERATING VEHICLE W/O INSURANCE 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 41-6-61 IMPROPER USAGE OF LANES 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
Charge: 41-6-69 TURN/STOP/CHANGE LANES W/O SIGNAL 
Plea: Find: Dismissed 
Fine: 0.00 Susp: 0.00 
Jail: 0 Susp: 0 ACS: 
FEES AND ASSESSMENTS: 
Fine Description: FINE -PROSECUTOR SPL 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
Fine Description: SURCHARGE - 85% 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
TOTAL FINES AND ASSESMENTS: 
Credit: 0.00 Paid: 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
0 . 0 0 
Due: 
Due: 
Due: 
3 
2 
6 
HAWLEY, NATASHA CASE NO: 955013327 PAC! 
PROBATION TERMS & CONDITIONS: 
12 MO PROB W/COURT TERMS: 1 NO OTHER VIOLATIONS 2. CONTINUE 
COUNSELING W/PRIVATE PROVIDER FOR ANXIETY AND PROVIDE VERIF OF 
CONTINUED COUNSELING OR COMPLETION OF COUNSELING BY END OF 
PROBATION 3. TIMELY PAYMENT 
TRACKING: 
Fine Stay 
Probation 
Other 
08/28/96 
02/28/97 
12/28/96 
CALENDAR: 
PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 02/28/96 09:00 AM in rm 2 with JUDITH ATHERTON 
DOCKET INFORMATION: 
Chrg: DUI TO RECKLESS 
Fine Amount: 
Jail: 60 DAYS 
Plea: Find: Guilty Plea 
600.00 Suspended: .00 
Suspended: 60 DAYS 
BY THE COURT 
(jy****}#t gut 
JUDGE, CIRCUIT CO 
Bw. 
UR5P-N 
NOTE: APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN 30 J^WP L 'SID AT nsSSTlCK OF JuOGE 
OF ENTRY OF THIS JUDGMENT. 
Cte* 
